USR/CoreFab Formal Specification v0.1.0
The constitutional formalization of orchestration — where UWA components are coordinated over UCN networks into sovereign constitutional action.Preamble
This document is the formal specification of USR (Universal Sovereign Runtime) and CoreFab (Constitutional Fabrication). It defines how UWA components are orchestrated and how UCN networks are coordinated to produce sovereign constitutional execution.
USR does not define what a component is (that is UWA). USR does not define how components communicate across a network (that is UCN). USR defines how validated components are orchestrated into deterministic constitutional action — the runtime that makes components execute, attests to their behavior, and enforces sovereignty.
The v0.1.0 implementation proved that constitutional execution is possible. This specification proves that it is definable, verifiable, and sovereign.
This specification answers the constitutional question: How is meaning executed? It defines the invariants that execution must satisfy — the properties that hold true regardless of implementation. Mechanisms (Rust, WIT, SHA-256) are implementation choices; invariants are constitutional law.
Classification: Constitutional — defines orchestration law for all of ICore. Derivation:UWA + UCN → USR/CoreFab (orchestration engine)
Depends on: UWA (execution requires components to orchestrate) and UCN (orchestration across sovereign nodes requires networking). Transitively the entire stack above USCP.
Depended on by: UCA (adapters bridge the orchestrated runtime to external systems). UCA is the constitutional boundary; USR/CoreFab is the constitutional interior.
Section 1: Foundational Axioms
Every runtime capability must trace to these axioms. Nothing exists in USR/CoreFab that these axioms do not authorize.
1.1 The Five Runtime Axioms
| # | Axiom | Statement | Derived From |
|---|---|---|---|
| RA1 | Execution requires identity. | No operation may execute without a declared, verified constitutional identity. An anonymous operation is an attack, not execution. | Identity (USCP) |
| RA2 | Execution requires determinism. | The same input, the same operation, the same component → the same output. Every time. Without exception. Non-determinism is constitutional failure. | Verification (USCP) |
| RA3 | Execution requires provenance. | Every execution produces a cryptographically verifiable record of what happened, when, and to what effect. Untracked execution is unconstitutional. | Relationship (USCP) |
| RA4 | Execution requires isolation. | Components may only access resources they have been explicitly granted. Capability is never implied — only declared and verified. | Constraint (USCP) |
| RA5 | Execution requires sovereignty. | No external system may override, redirect, or suppress constitutional execution. The runtime is the constitutional interior — the world beyond UCA cannot reach in. | Existence (USCP) |
1.2 Axiom Sufficiency
All six USCP primitives are represented across the axioms:
| Primitive | Present In | Role |
|---|---|---|
| Existence | RA5 (sovereignty) | The runtime exists and cannot be overridden |
| Identity | RA1 (identity) | Operations declare who executes them |
| Relationship | RA3 (provenance) | Executions produce traceable chains |
| Constraint | RA4 (isolation) | Capabilities are bounded and granted |
| Transformation | RA2 (determinism) | Execution transforms input to output predictably |
| Verification | RA3 (provenance) | Attestation verifies what happened |
These axioms are invariants. They define what must always be true. The mechanisms below (WIT interfaces, Rust modules, SHA-256) are implementation choices that satisfy these invariants — they could be replaced by any conforming implementation.
Section 2: The USR Model
2.1 Definitions
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| USR | Universal Sovereign Runtime — the constitutional orchestration environment that coordinates UWA components over UCN networks. Provides isolation, attestation, and sovereign execution. |
| CoreFab | Constitutional Fabrication — the orchestration engine operating within USR. Orchestrates component execution deterministically and produces provenance. |
| Component | A constitutional unit defined by UWA and orchestrated by USR. USR does not define components — it orchestrates them. |
| Blueprint | A declarative specification of a component and its intended execution. Blueprints are constitutionally validated by USR before orchestration. |
| Operation | A discrete constitutional action orchestrated by USR. Operations are named, registered, and deterministic. |
| Capability | A grant of access to a governed resource, with explicit permissions and optional expiration. Capabilities are never implicit. |
2.2 The Relationship Between USR and CoreFab
USR is the constitutional runtime environment. CoreFab is the constitutional execution engine operating within that environment.
Neither is complete without the other. Neither pretends to be the other.
USR (environment):
├── Identity system — declares who exists
├── Isolation system — governs what is accessible
├── Orchestration system — manages lifecycle and communication
└── CoreFab (engine):
├── Execution engine — runs operations
└── Attestation engine — proves what happened
The environment wraps the engine. The engine operates within the environment. A component is registered by the environment, then executed by the engine, then attested by the engine, then managed by the environment.
2.3 Constitutional Layer
| Property | Value |
|---|---|
| Layer ordinal | 5 (Execution) |
| Layer name | Execution |
| Derives from | Layer 4 (Expression): UVS |
| Depended on by | Layer 6 (Implementation): UCA, UCD |
| Governance status | Constitutional — runtime changes require Part IV full pipeline |
Section 2.5: The Doctrine Position
USR occupies a specific position in the constitutional doctrine:
| Doctrine Principle | USR Position |
|---|---|
| Constitution before architecture | USR's axioms (RA1-RA5) are constitutional law, derived from USCP primitives |
| Architecture before implementation | The six contracts (C1-C6) define the architecture; Rust/WIT are implementation |
| Implementation before optimization | v0.1.0 proved execution is possible; this spec makes it normative |
Section 3: The Constitutional Contract Model
3.1 WIT as Constitutional Law
The WebAssembly Interface Types (WIT) interfaces defined in wit/constitutional.wit are not merely APIs — they are constitutional execution contracts. Their stability is more important than any Rust implementation.
A WIT interface is the execution-level equivalent of a USCP primitive: it defines the irreducible surface area through which constitutional execution occurs.
3.2 The Six Contracts
| # | Contract | Question Answered | Interface |
|---|---|---|---|
| C1 | Identity | Who is this component? | identity |
| C2 | Execution | What does it do? | execution |
| C3 | Constraints | What rules govern it? | constraints |
| C4 | Isolation | What can it access? | isolation |
| C5 | Attestation | What did it do? | attestation |
| C6 | Orchestration | How does it communicate? | orchestration |
3.3 Contract Completeness
Every contract answers one of the six USCP constitutional questions:
| USCP Question | Contract | Implementation Module |
|---|---|---|
| What is? (Existence) | C4 (Isolation) — defines what exists within a component's boundary | isolation.rs |
| Who/what is it? (Identity) | C1 (Identity) — declares component identity | identity.rs |
| How is it connected? (Relationship) | C6 (Orchestration) — manages communication between components | orchestration.rs |
| What governs it? (Constraint) | C3 (Constraints) — enforces constitutional validation rules | constraints.rs |
| How does it change? (Transformation) | C2 (Execution) — transforms input to output deterministically | execution.rs |
| How do we know it is valid? (Verification) | C5 (Attestation) — proves execution happened as claimed | attestation.rs |
Section 4: The Identity Contract (C1)
4.1 Specification
| Property | Requirement |
|---|---|
| Record | component-id { id, name, layer, version, parents, question } |
| Operations | declare() → component-id, verify() → bool |
| ID derivation | SHA-256(name:layer:version:parents) — deterministic, reproducible |
4.2 Identity Invariants
| # | Invariant | Statement |
|---|---|---|
| I1 | Non-empty name | Every component must have a non-empty human-readable name. |
| I2 | Valid layer | Every component must declare a valid constitutional layer (Pre, Uscp, Usc, Science, Expression, Execution, Implementation). |
| I3 | Pre-constitutional purity | Pre-constitutional components cannot have parents — they are the origin. |
| I4 | Derivation requirement | Non-pre-constitutional components must have at least one parent. |
| I5 | Question answered | Every component must answer a constitutional question. |
| I6 | Uniqueness | No two components may share the same ID. |
4.3 Identity Verification Protocol
A component identity is verified if and only if:
- The name is non-empty (I1)
- The layer is valid (I2)
- Pre-constitutional components have no parents (I3)
- Non-pre components have at least one parent (I4)
- A constitutional question is answered (I5)
- The ID matches the derivation
SHA-256(name:layer:version:parents)(deterministic)
Section 5: The Execution Contract (C2)
5.1 Specification
| Property | Requirement |
|---|---|
| Record | Operation { name, input, component_id } |
| Result | ExecutionResult { operation, input_hash, output, output_hash, timestamp, success, error } |
| Operations | execute(operation, input) → result, check_permission(operation) → bool, list_operations() → list |
| Registered operations | Must be explicitly registered before execution |
5.2 Execution Invariants
| # | Invariant | Statement |
|---|---|---|
| E1 | Registration required | An operation must be registered before it can be executed. Unregistered operations cause ExecutionError. |
| E2 | Deterministic output | For a given operation name, input, and component, the output is identical across all executions. |
| E3 | Input provenance | Every execution records SHA-256(input) as input_hash. |
| E4 | Output provenance | Every execution records SHA-256(output) as output_hash. |
| E5 | Temporal provenance | Every execution records a UTC ISO 8601 timestamp. |
| E6 | Error transparency | Failed executions record the error string and set success = false. The error is never swallowed. |
5.3 Determinism Requirement
Determinism (E2) is the hardest and most important invariant. It means:
- No external state is read during execution (no network, no filesystem, no randomness)
- No global mutable state affects the output
- The same serialized input always produces the same serialized output
- The function
f(operation, input) → outputis pure
5.4 Registered Operations (v0.1.0)
| Operation | Purpose | Input | Output |
|---|---|---|---|
validate-identity | Validate a component identity against constitutional rules | JSON with name, layer, question | { valid, issues } |
check-derivation | Verify D1-D5 derivation compliance | JSON with parent_layer, child_layer | { d1_downward_only, parent_layer, child_layer } |
enforce-constraint | Enforce a specific constitutional constraint | JSON with type, parameters | { enforced, rule } |
compute-hash | Compute SHA-256 of input | Raw input data | { hash } |
Section 6: The Constraints Contract (C3)
6.1 The Six Constitutional Questions
Every claim, component, or operation must answer the six constitutional questions:
| # | Question | Question | Runtime Interpretation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Q1 | Existence | "What is?" | Does the claim/component/operation refer to something that exists within the runtime? |
| Q2 | Identity | "Who/what is it?" | Can the entity be uniquely identified by its component ID? |
| Q3 | Relationship | "How is it connected?" | Are the parent-child derivation relationships defined? |
| Q4 | Constraint | "What governs it?" | Are the isolation boundaries and permission constraints explicit? |
| Q5 | Transformation | "How does it change?" | Are the operation's transformation rules defined and deterministic? |
| Q6 | Verification | "How do we know it is valid?" | Can its execution correctness be verified through attestation? |
6.2 The Ten Verification Tests
The runtime enforces the Kernel's 10 constitutional tests as execution constraints:
| # | Test | Runtime Enforcement |
|---|---|---|
| T1 | Reality | Operations must act on registered, verifiable components |
| T2 | Origin | Every execution traces to a declared component identity |
| T3 | Necessity | Each registered operation must serve a constitutional purpose |
| T4 | Derivation | Components must follow D1-D5 derivation rules |
| T5 | Consistency | No operation may contradict another operation's results |
| T6 | Verification | Every execution is attestable |
| T7 | Simplicity | Each operation does exactly one constitutional thing |
| T8 | Sovereignty | No operation may invoke external systems |
| T9 | Replaceability | Operation implementations are interface-bounded (WIT) |
| T10 | Evolution | Operations can be superseded without destroying attestation chains |
6.3 Claim Validation
The constraint engine validates claims against the six questions:
| Question | Structural Requirement |
|---|---|
| Existence | Claim must have a non-empty content field |
| Identity | Claim must have a name or id field |
| Relationship | Claim must have a type, category, or relationships field |
| Constraint | Claim must have a constraints or rules field |
| Transformation | Claim must have a transformations field or be marked immutable |
| Verification | Claim must have a verification or verified field |
6.4 Derivation Rules Enforcement
The constraint engine enforces the five derivation rules from Part II:
| # | Rule | Enforcement |
|---|---|---|
| D1 | Downward only | child_layer ≥ parent_layer (layer ordinal) |
| D2 | No upward mutation | Architectural invariant — enforced by the layer system itself |
| D3 | Merge requires justification | All parent layers must be cited in the derivation |
| D4 | Adaptation boundary | Components at layer ≤ 5 (Execution) are within the constitutional boundary |
| D5 | Derivatives composed | UCD elements are composed from UCA capabilities, not re-derived from the kernel |
| D6 | Platform layers sequential | Platform layers are sequential — UWA → UCN → UAS → USR → UCA. No parallelism at this level. |
| D7 | Applications constitutionally derived | Applications are constitutionally derived — USDS, UCF, and agent apps derive from UCD. They follow the rules. |
Section 7: The Isolation Contract (C4)
7.1 Specification
| Property | Requirement |
|---|---|
| Model | Capability-based security — access is never implicit |
| Record | Capability { resource, permissions, expires, granted_to, granted_at } |
| Operations | request_capability(resource, permissions) → capability, check_capability(resource, permission) → bool, revoke_capability(resource) → bool |
7.2 Governed Resources
| Resource | Description |
|---|---|
execution | Access to execute operations |
attestation | Access to create attestations |
orchestration | Access to manage lifecycle |
identity | Access to identity operations |
constraints | Access to constraint enforcement |
storage | Access to persistent state |
network | Access to external communication (reserved — sovereign runtime may not grant this) |
7.3 Isolation Invariants
| # | Invariant | Statement |
|---|---|---|
| S1 | Explicit grant | A component has no access to any resource unless explicitly granted a capability. |
| S2 | Permission specificity | A capability grants specific named permissions (e.g., execute, attest), not blanket access. |
| S3 | Temporal bounding | Capabilities may have an expiration timestamp or be permanent. |
| S4 | Revocability | Any capability may be revoked. Revocation is immediate. |
| S5 | No implicit escalation | Granting execution on execution does not imply attestation on attestation. Each permission is independent. |
| S6 | Governed resources only | Capabilities may only be requested for the seven governed resources. Unknown resources cause CapabilityNotGranted. |
7.4 The Sovereignty Boundary
The network resource is governed but constitutionally restricted. The sovereignty axiom (RA5) means:
- A runtime may grant
networkcapability to a component - But the grant must be constitutionally justified
- Network access is the one capability that can violate sovereignty
- UCA (the adapter layer) is the proper boundary for external communication, not individual component capabilities
Section 8: The Attestation Contract (C5)
8.1 Specification
| Property | Requirement |
|---|---|
| Record | AttestationRecord { component_id, operation, input_hash, output_hash, timestamp, result, signature } |
| Operations | attest(record) → record, verify(record) → bool, get_attestation_chain(component_id) → list |
| Signature | SHA-256("attestation:" + signing_data) where signing_data = "component_id:operation:input_hash:output_hash:timestamp:result" |
8.2 Attestation Invariants
| # | Invariant | Statement |
|---|---|---|
| A1 | Post-execution only | An attestation may only be created after an execution completes. |
| A2 | Input binding | The attestation records SHA-256(input) — the exact input that was processed. |
| A3 | Output binding | The attestation records SHA-256(output) — the exact output that was produced. |
| A4 | Cryptographic binding | The signature is a hash of all record fields concatenated in canonical order. |
| A5 | Chain integrity | The full attestation chain for a runtime must be internally consistent — every record must verify. |
| A6 | Append-only | Attestation records are never modified after creation. New records are appended. |
8.3 Attestation Verification Protocol
To verify an attestation record:
- Recompute
signing_datafrom the record fields:component_id:operation:input_hash:output_hash:timestamp:result - Recompute
signaturefrom"attestation:" + signing_data - Compare the recomputed signature with the stored signature
- Verify the record exists in the runtime's attestation chain
AttestationFailed.
8.4 Upgrade Path
The v0.1.0 attestation uses SHA-256 as a simplified signature. Production implementations should upgrade to asymmetric cryptography (Ed25519 or similar) through the UCA adapter boundary. The WIT interface is designed to accommodate this — the signature field is a string, not a fixed algorithm.
Section 9: The Orchestration Contract (C6)
9.1 Specification
| Property | Requirement |
|---|---|
| State machine | 6 states: Registered → Initialized → Running ↔ Paused → Stopped. Error is a terminal fault state. |
| Operations | register, initialize, start, pause, stop, get_state, send_message, get_dependency_graph |
9.2 Lifecycle State Machine
┌────────────┐
│ Registered │ ← initial state after identity verification
└─────┬──────┘
↓
┌────────────┐
│Initialized │ ← capabilities granted, constraints loaded
└─────┬──────┘
↓
┌────────────┐
┌────→│ Running │ ← executing operations, producing attestations
│ └──┬─────┬──┘
│ ↓ ↓
│ ┌──────┐ ┌─────────┐
└──│Paused│ │ Stopped │
└──────┘ └─────────┘
┌────────────┐
│ Error │ ← terminal fault state (unrecoverable)
└────────────┘
9.3 Valid Transitions
| From | To | Operation |
|---|---|---|
| — | Registered | register() |
| Registered | Initialized | initialize() |
| Initialized | Running | start() |
| Running | Paused | pause() |
| Paused | Running | start() |
| Running | Stopped | stop() |
| Paused | Stopped | stop() |
| Registered | Error | Runtime fault |
| Initialized | Error | Runtime fault |
| Running | Error | Runtime fault |
| Paused | Error | Runtime fault |
| Stopped | terminal | No further transitions |
9.4 Orchestration Invariants
| # | Invariant | Statement |
|---|---|---|
| O1 | Sequential initialization | A component must be Registered before Initialized, Initialized before Running. No state skipping. |
| O2 | Message requires Running | A component may only send or receive messages when in the Running state. |
| O3 | No double-stop | A Stopped component cannot be stopped again. |
| O4 | Dependency graph integrity | The dependency graph reflects the current state of all registered components. |
| O5 | Error transparency | Error states record which component faulted and why. |
Section 10: The Blueprint Model
10.1 Blueprint Structure
A constitutional blueprint is a JSON document describing a component and its intended execution:
{
"name": "component-name",
"id": "optional-explicit-id",
"layer": "impl",
"operation": "validate-identity",
"input": "{...}",
"parents": ["parent-component-id"]
}
10.2 Blueprint Validation Rules
| # | Rule | Statement |
|---|---|---|
| B1 | Name required | The name field must be present and non-empty. |
| B2 | Layer required | The layer field must be present and must name a valid constitutional layer. |
| B3 | Layer validity | The layer must resolve to one of: pre, uscp, usc, science, expression, execution, impl/implementation. |
| B4 | Valid JSON | The blueprint must be valid JSON. |
10.3 Blueprint Execution Lifecycle
Blueprint (JSON) → Validate → Register Identity → Register Orchestration
→ Request Capabilities → Initialize → Start → Execute Operation
→ Attest Result → Return
Every step is constitutional. If any step fails, the execution returns a ConstitutionalError and the runtime remains consistent.
Section 11: The Constitutional Error Model
11.1 Error Taxonomy
| Error | Category | Trigger |
|---|---|---|
IdentityNotDeclared | Identity | Component has no name, no question, or is already registered |
ConstraintViolation | Constraints | D1-D5 violation, layer ordering violation, question unanswered |
CapabilityNotGranted | Isolation | Resource not governed, capability not granted, capability expired |
AttestationFailed | Attestation | Signature mismatch, record not in chain |
OrchestrationError | Orchestration | Invalid state transition, component not found, component in error state |
ExecutionError | Execution | Operation not registered, unknown operation |
BlueprintInvalid | Blueprint | Missing required field, invalid layer, invalid JSON |
11.2 Error Properties
| # | Property | Statement |
|---|---|---|
| EP1 | Transparent | Every error carries a human-readable message explaining the failure. |
| EP2 | Classified | Every error belongs to exactly one contract category. |
| EP3 | Non-destructive | Errors do not corrupt runtime state. The runtime remains consistent after any error. |
| EP4 | Traceable | Errors reference the specific invariant or rule that was violated. |
Section 12: Runtime Composition
12.1 The Six Engines
The USR runtime is composed of six engines, each implementing one contract:
| Engine | Contract | Implementation |
|---|---|---|
IdentityRegistry | C1 (Identity) | Maintains the registry of all declared component identities |
ExecutionEngine | C2 (Execution) | Executes registered operations deterministically |
ConstraintEngine | C3 (Constraints) | Enforces the six questions, ten tests, and five derivation rules |
IsolationEngine | C4 (Isolation) | Manages capability grants, checks, and revocations |
AttestationEngine | C5 (Attestation) | Creates and verifies cryptographic provenance records |
OrchestrationEngine | C6 (Orchestration) | Manages component lifecycle state and inter-component messages |
12.2 Runtime Initialization
A new USR runtime initializes with:
- Empty identity registry
- Four registered operations:
validate-identity,check-derivation,enforce-constraint,compute-hash - Empty constraint validator
- Empty capability store
- Empty attestation chain
- Empty orchestration state
12.3 Runtime Verification
The runtime provides a verify() method that checks global consistency:
identity.verify_all()— all registered components pass identity verification and D1 layer orderingisolation.verify_all()— all granted capabilities are non-expiredattestation.verify_chain()— every attestation record verifies cryptographicallyorchestration.verify_all()— no component is in an Error state
Section 13: Conformance Criteria
13.1 Runtime Conformance Tests
An implementation conforms to the USR/CoreFab Formal Specification if and only if:
| # | Test | Pass Criterion | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|
| USR-01 | Identity Registration | Components are registered with all six component-id fields. Registration verifies invariants I1-I6. | Critical |
| USR-02 | Identity Uniqueness | No two components share the same ID. Duplicate registration is rejected. | Critical |
| USR-03 | D1 Enforcement | Parent layers have equal or lower ordinal than child layers. Violation produces ConstraintViolation. | Critical |
| USR-04 | Operation Registration | Operations must be registered before execution. Unregistered operations produce ExecutionError. | Critical |
| USR-05 | Deterministic Execution | For identical (operation, input, component_id), the output is identical across all executions within the same runtime version. | Critical |
| USR-06 | Execution Provenance | Every execution produces input_hash (SHA-256 of input) and output_hash (SHA-256 of output). | Critical |
| USR-07 | Capability Enforcement | No component accesses a resource without an explicit, non-expired capability grant. | Critical |
| USR-08 | Capability Revocation | Revoked capabilities are immediately effective. Subsequent access checks return false. | Major |
| USR-09 | Attestation Integrity | Every attestation record verifies (signature matches recomputed value). | Critical |
| USR-10 | Chain Consistency | The full attestation chain passes verify_chain(). No record in the chain has a broken signature. | Critical |
| USR-11 | Lifecycle Compliance | Components follow the state machine: Registered → Initialized → Running ↔ Paused → Stopped. No invalid transitions. | Critical |
| USR-12 | Message Isolation | Messages may only be sent between Running-state components. | Major |
| USR-13 | Blueprint Validation | Blueprints must have name and layer. Invalid blueprints are rejected before execution. | Critical |
| USR-14 | Error Transparency | Every error carries a classified, human-readable message. No silent failures. | Major |
| USR-15 | Runtime Self-Verification | runtime.verify() checks identity, isolation, attestation, and orchestration consistency. | Critical |
13.2 Conformance Levels
| Level | Name | Requirements | Certification |
|---|---|---|---|
| R0 | Non-Conformant | Fails any Critical test. | None. May not claim USR conformance. |
| R1 | Core Conformant | Passes all Critical tests + ≤2 Major failures. | May operate as a constitutional runtime. |
| R2 | Fully Conformant | Passes all 15 tests (15/15). | May enter the canonical reference. Eligible for standardization. |
13.3 Conformance Protocol
- Declarate scope: Implementation declares which contracts (C1-C6) it implements.
- Apply tests: Run all applicable tests (USR-01 through USR-15).
- Record evidence: For each test, record what was checked, what was found, pass/fail.
- Determine level: Count Critical and Major failures. Apply level rules.
- Archive: Conformance Record stored as a constitutional artifact.
Section 14: Self-Verification
14.1 Against the 10 Constitutional Tests
USR/CoreFab Formal Specification v0.1.0 verified against the Kernel's 10 constitutional tests:
| # | Test | Result | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Reality | ✅ PASS | The specification addresses the real need: formal rules for constitutional execution. Every section maps to a demonstrated implementation capability. |
| 2 | Origin | ✅ PASS | Derived from UVS (Layer 4) and transitively the entire stack. All axioms trace to USCP primitives (Section 1.1). The six contracts map one-to-one to the six constitutional questions (Section 3.3). |
| 3 | Necessity | ✅ PASS | Without USR/CoreFab, constitutional operations cannot execute with sovereignty guarantees. The kernel has no mechanism for deterministic, provenance-tracked execution without this specification. |
| 4 | Derivation | ✅ PASS | Follows D1 (derived from UVS, the layer below). Follows D3 (derives from UVS which merges URS). No upward mutations. |
| 5 | Consistency | ✅ PASS | No axiom contradicts another. No invariant conflicts with a different invariant. The six contracts are orthogonal. The lifecycle state machine has no unreachable states. |
| 6 | Verification | ✅ PASS | Every axiom can be verified by tracing to USCP primitives. The 15 conformance tests provide a concrete verification protocol for implementations. |
| 7 | Simplicity | ✅ PASS | Five axioms, six contracts, fifteen conformance tests. Each element exists because removing it creates a constitutional gap. No redundant abstractions. |
| 8 | Sovereignty | ✅ PASS | The runtime introduces no external dependencies. Cryptographic primitives (SHA-256) are the only algorithmic requirement, and they serve sovereignty (attestation), not external coupling. |
| 9 | Replaceability | ✅ PASS | The WIT contracts are technology-independent. Rust, C, Go, or any language implementing the WIT interfaces produces a conforming runtime. SHA-256 can be upgraded to Ed25519 through the attestation contract. |
| 10 | Evolution | ✅ PASS | The specification can be amended through Part IV governance. New operations can be registered. New capabilities can be governed. The WIT interface is the stability boundary; implementations evolve freely. |
Section 15: Relationship to v0.1.0 Implementation
This formal specification captures what v0.1.0 demonstrated and makes it normative:
| Implementation (demonstrated) | Specification (normative) | Status |
|---|---|---|
identity.rs — ComponentId, IdentityRegistry | Section 4: Identity Contract | Formalized |
execution.rs — Operation, ExecutionResult, 4 operations | Section 5: Execution Contract | Formalized |
constraints.rs — 6 questions, 10 tests, D1-D5 enforcement | Section 6: Constraints Contract | Formalized |
isolation.rs — Capability, 7 governed resources | Section 7: Isolation Contract | Formalized |
attestation.rs — AttestationRecord, chain verification | Section 8: Attestation Contract | Formalized |
orchestration.rs — LifecycleState, Message, state machine | Section 9: Orchestration Contract | Formalized |
runtime.rs — UsrRuntime composition, blueprint execution | Section 12: Runtime Composition | Formalized |
main.rs — CLI interface (version, capabilities, validate, execute, verify) | Section 10: Blueprint Model | Formalized |
constitutional.wit — 6 WIT interfaces, world declaration | Section 3: Contract Model | Formalized |
| D1-D5 derivation checks in execution.rs | Section 6.4: Derivation Rules | Formalized |
- Normative axioms — the five runtime axioms (RA1-RA5) are constitutional law, not code comments
- Invariant completeness — 31 named invariants across all contracts (I1-I6, E1-E6, S1-S6, A1-A6, O1-O5, B1-B4, EP1-EP4)
- Conformance tests — 15 formalized tests (USR-01 through USR-15) with severity levels
- Determinism requirement — formalized as the hardest invariant (Section 5.3), not just a code pattern
- Sovereignty boundary — the
networkresource restriction (Section 7.4) is constitutional law - Error model — classified, transparent, non-destructive, traceable (Section 11)
Appendix: Implementation Module Reference
| Module | File | Lines | Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|
| lib.rs | USR-CoreFab/src/lib.rs | 116 | Root: ConstitutionalLayer, Primitive, error types, sha256, timestamp |
| identity.rs | USR-CoreFab/src/identity.rs | 139 | ComponentId, IdentityRegistry, verification |
| execution.rs | USR-CoreFab/src/execution.rs | 161 | Operation, ExecutionResult, deterministic execution |
| constraints.rs | USR-CoreFab/src/constraints.rs | 196 | 6 questions, 10 tests, D1-D5 enforcement |
| isolation.rs | USR-CoreFab/src/isolation.rs | 127 | Capability, IsolationEngine, resource governance |
| attestation.rs | USR-CoreFab/src/attestation.rs | 121 | AttestationRecord, chain, verification |
| orchestration.rs | USR-CoreFab/src/orchestration.rs | 213 | LifecycleState, Message, state machine, dependency graph |
| runtime.rs | USR-CoreFab/src/runtime.rs | 204 | UsrRuntime composition, blueprint execution, verify |
| main.rs | USR-CoreFab/src/main.rs | 81 | CLI interface |
| constitutional.wit | USR-CoreFab/wit/constitutional.wit | 179 | WIT constitutional contracts |
| Total | ~1,537 |
Originator Attribution
This USR/CoreFab Formal Specification v0.1.0 is originated, created, and concept-pioneered by:
Originator: Sir Collins — Creator and Concept Pioneer of ICore (access1@tutamail.com) Date of origination: July 16, 2026 Scope: All axioms, contract models, invariants, execution semantics, lifecycle models, error models, conformance criteria, and verification protocols presented in this specification.This attribution is a constitutional artifact. It establishes provenance — the lowest and most fundamental layer of trust.
USR/CoreFab is the Constitution's muscle. This specification is the Constitution's promise that the muscle will only move what the Constitution authorizes — deterministically, provably, and sovereignly.